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Abstract
Over sixty percent of employees at a large South African financial services
company select the minimum rate of 7.5 percent for their monthly retirement
contributions—far below the recommended rate of 15 percent. I use a field
experiment to investigate whether providing employees with a retirement cal-
culator, which shows projections of retirement income, leads to increases in
contributions. The average treatment effect is positive but very small and not
statistically different from zero.
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1 Introduction
The Eighth Wonder of the World—is compound interest.
Since as early as 1925, asset managers have extolled the wonder of compound in-
terest.1 If you only start saving early enough, you will see your savings double—again
and again. Employers and governments share a similar reverence for compound inter-
est. Substantial tax and salary incentives encourage employees to start saving early
and, in many countries, the government compels employees to save for retirement.
Employees do not seem to share the same admiration for compound interest. As
the responsibility of saving for retirement has shifted from employers to employees
in most countries (Choi, 2015), very few employees exceed the minimum or default
retirement savings rate (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Choi
et al., 2004; Chetty et al., 2014). Perhaps, employees do not fully appreciate the gains
provided by compound interest?
People struggle to make even the most basic calculations about compound interest
and inflation (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) and tend to underestimate exponential
growth (Stango and Zinman, 2009; Levy and Tasoff, 2016; Goda et al., 2019). If
employees only understood how a small increase in saving today could have a massive
impact in retirement, increased retirement savings may follow.2
In this paper, I use a field experiment at a large South African financial services
company to test if making compound interest calculations easier causes increased
contributions to a tax deferred retirement account. The treatment group received
a custom-built calculator to estimate income at retirement. Even though employees
found the calculator helpful, the calculator had only a zero to marginally positive
impact on contribution rates.
The lack of response to the calculator is surprising given that over sixty percent
of the employees at the company contribute at the minimum rate of 7.5 percent,
1The quote “The Eighth Wonder of the World—is compound interest.” is often attributed to
Albert Einstein but he likely never said those words. The famous statement was used by The
Equity Savings and Loan Company for an advertisement in 1925. See quoteinvestigator.com for
more details.
2Even though the power of compound interest may be a basic concept, calculating optimal retire-
ment wealth is very challenging—even for economists (Skinner, 2007; Poterba, 2015). In the setting
studied in this paper, most employees have projected retirement wealth far below common bench-
marks so calculating the optimum may be less beneficial than simply appreciating the magnitude of
long-term compound growth.
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which will provide a retirement income equal to about a third of current salary. The
retirement calculator suggests employees need to save at a rate of 15 percent (and
sometimes more) to prevent a large drop of income at retirement. If employees were
already saving at a rate close to 15 percent, we may expect little change in behavior.
Since the current saving rates are so low, the lack of response is puzzling.
The lack of response is also surprising given that the intervention was timed to
coincide with a salary increase. The employees were sent the calculator one week
before receiving a letter about their yearly bonus and salary increase for the coming
year. Any changes to an employee’s contribution rate would only be applied the
following month—to coincide with the salary increase. An employee could raise his
or her contribution rate without changing the nominal amount of his or her after-tax
salary.3
It is unlikely that the treatment group increased retirement savings through other
means than the company retirement account. Since contributions to the retirement
account are not taxed, the employees have a strong incentive to use the retirement
account to save for retirement. The retirement account also offers a wide range of
mutual funds so it is unlikely employees would seek to open a retirement account with
an external provider to access a specific investment portfolio.
To ensure the low average treatment effects do not conceal large impacts for certain
subgroups, I test for heterogeneous treatment effects using groups specified in a pre-
analysis plan. I find slightly larger impacts for older workers but no differences by
gender or Apartheid era racial classifications. The heterogeneous impacts by age may
reflect that retirement is a more immediate concern for older workers.4
This paper contributes to a literature investigating how people respond to projec-
tions of retirement income.5 A field experiment in the United States added retirement
3People often care more about changes in nominal salary than real salary (Shafir, Diamond, and
Tversky, 1997). Price inflation in South African hovers around 6 percent so even if the employee’s
salary increase only matches inflation, he or she can still increase the contribution rate by at least
6 percent without decreasing the nominal salary.
4As shown by the seminal theories of life-cycle consumption, an employee with rising income may
wish to only start saving for retirement many years after he or she has started working (Modigliani
and Brumberg, 1954; Friedman, 1957).
5 Providing income projections is not the only type of information intervention thought to impact
retirement savings. Many employers, particularly in the United States, encourage retirement saving
by matching the retirement contributions of their employees. The more the employee contributes,
the more the employer contributes. Several field experiments focus on communicating information
about the match as the arrangement provides an instant return on investment. Some find positive
impacts on contribution rates (Clark, Maki, and Morrill, 2014; Goldin, Homonoff, and Tucker-Ray,
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income and balance projections to a brochure for employees of the University of Min-
nesota and found small increases (0.15 percent of average salary) in retirement saving
among the treatment group (Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner, 2014). The projec-
tions in the brochure were not personalized to specific employees but rather showed
the marginal benefit of additional savings on projected retirement income.
Personalized information, which uses the employee’s current age, account balance
and savings rate, may be more useful than generic information. A field experiment
in Chile used self-service terminals at government offices to provide either generic
or personalized information for participants in the government’s defined contribution
pension plan (Fuentes et al., 2018). The personalized information caused a 1.5 percent
increase in the number of individuals making voluntary contributions to the pension
plan and the change was concentrated among participants who overestimated their
retirement income.
Besides specific interventions tested with field experiments, researchers have also
used natural experiments to understand the impact of retirement income projec-
tions. People typically receive information on retirement benefits through emailed or
posted statements. The administrative systems used to send out these statements
can generate random variation in information provision. In the United States, the
Social Security Administration’s annual statement, which shows expected social se-
curity benefits, caused improvements in knowledge but no changes in behavior (Mas-
trobuoni, 2011; Carter and Skimmyhorn, 2018). In contrast, the pension statement
in Germany, which shows similar information, caused saving to increase by 14 euros
on average, an 11 percent increase relative to the sample mean (Dolls et al., 2018). A
personalized statement of pension benefits in Chile increased the likelihood of volun-
tary retirement saving by 1.3 percent (Fajnzylber and Reyes, 2015). These natural
experiments are consistent with the field experiment results of mostly small positive
impacts of communicating retirement income projections. More generally, a growing
base of evidence suggests that financial education initiatives improve knowledge but
provide only minor impacts on behavior (Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014;
Miller et al., 2015; Kaiser and Menkhoff, 2017).
2017; Perry, 2019) while others find no statistically significant impacts (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian,
2011) or even positive and negative effects depending on the wording of the communication (Choi
et al., 2017). In addition to emphasizing matching incentives, a recent field experiment emphasized
other benefits, such as longevity and tax advantages, and found small positive effects but did not
detect differences in effects depending on the type of information communicated (Clark et al., 2019).
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One exception to the trend of small impacts from financial education interventions
is a field experiment involving rural farmers in China (Song, 2020). The intervention
combined retirement income projections with a lesson on compound interest. The
education intervention caused a 40 percent increase in savings relative to the control
group—far larger than the impacts in other studies. The timing of the intervention
might explain part of the difference. Song’s (2020) intervention was conducted at the
time of enrollment and very few farmers changed their enrollment rate after the initial
selection. Financial education interventions generally have larger impacts when timed
to coincide with a relevant financial choice (Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014).
As emphasized by Hastings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn (2013), policymakers need
to know which types of financial education tools are most effective to improve finan-
cial outcomes. The main innovation of the retirement calculator is allowing for in-
teraction.6 Previous experiments provided information by email, on brochures or on
computer display terminals. A retirement calculator allows employees to adjust the
assumptions and see how different choices affect their retirement income. We may
expect larger impacts from an interactive tool given that active rather than passive
methods of teaching have been shown to improve learning (Freeman et al., 2014).
Policymakers may value the focus on this approach as a retirement calculator
provides several advantages over benefit statements. First, a calculator provides pri-
vacy as the provider of the calculator does not need to collect any data about the
employee. Second, the employee can personalize the calculation as he or she wishes,
even including savings that may not be observed by a single asset manager or by gov-
ernment. Even though I find no large positive impact on retirement contributions,
reliable publicly-provided retirement calculators may still provide substantial benefits
for employees.
Besides testing a new tool, this paper contributes to the literature by studying the
impact of providing retirement income projections in an new and relevant setting. As
in many developing countries, the tax base in South Africa is very small and the only
government provided retirement benefit is the Old-Age Grant, which is approximately
6Although not focused on retirement saving, a recent experiment with recipients of conditional
cash transfers in Colombia also used an interactive tool (Attanasio et al., 2019). A non-government
organization provided the recipients with a tablet computer containing a financial education program.
The tablet include games and other interactive elements. The researchers tested the impact of
providing the tablet on a wide variety of measures, but most were not statistically different from
zero after correcting for multiple-hypothesis testing. One exception was a sustained increase in
self-reported informal savings.
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10 percent of an entry-level salary at the company in this study. Lack of preparation
for retirement will likely have much stronger impacts on welfare in this setting than
in developed countries.
2 Setting and intervention
2.1 Retirement saving in South Africa
As in many countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, South
Africa relies on a private retirement system. The South African government provides
a needs-based Old Age Grant of R 1 780 per month (127 USD) but any additional
retirement income must be funded by private saving.
The South African government encourages people to save for retirement using tax
deferred retirement funds. South African tax law allows people to contribute up to
27.5 percent of their pre-tax salary to a retirement fund and no income tax is paid
on these contributions.7 The capital gains and dividends within the retirement fund
are also not taxed.
Retirement funds are provided by employers or by private asset management
companies. The largest employer fund is the Government Employee’s Pension Fund
(GEPF), with 1.2 million members and over 400 000 pensioners.8 Government em-
ployees contribute around 20 percent of their salary to the GEPF and receive a defined
benefit pension in return.
Despite the largest employer retirement fund using a defined benefit arrangement,
most employer retirement funds in South Africa use a defined contribution arrange-
ment, as is the growing trend in many countries (Choi, 2015). The defined contri-
bution retirement funds range in flexibility. Some employers require all employees
to contribute at a fixed rate while others allow employees to choose a contribution
rate within a band. Many employers, especially smaller companies, do not offer a re-
tirement fund. Instead, employees must use a retirement fund provided by a private
asset management company.
In Table 1, using survey data from the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS),
I calculate the share of employed South Africans who have retirement contributions
7The tax free contributions are capped at R 350 000. Visit www.sars.gov.za for more details on
the tax treatment of retirement funds in South Africa.
8See www.gepf.gov.za for more details on the Government Employee’s Pension Fund.
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deducted from their salary by their employer. As expected, the share of employees
with employer provided retirement funds increases with salary. Only 14 percent of
employees earning less than R 3 600 (250 USD) have retirement fund deductions
whereas 66 percent of employees earning more than R48 000 per month (3 330 USD)
have retirement fund deductions.
Table 1: Retirement fund offered by employer
Monthly wage Share of employed
population
Retirement fund
deducted from salary
95% confidence
interval
< R 3 600 26.91 14.17 8.89 - 19.47
R 3 600 - R 8 000 32.85 29.37 25.48 - 33.26
R 8 000 - R 15 000 17.53 46.84 42.92 - 50.77
R 15 000 - R 22 000 8.10 60.25 53.89 - 66.61
R 22 000 - R 48 000 9.55 63.62 58.23 - 69.01
> R 48 000 5.05 66.59 57.47 - 75.71
Source: Calculated from the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS) Wave 5, which
was conducted in 2017. The survey is nationally representative so the share shown in
the table is a sample estimate of the share in the population.
Our experiment is conducted with employees of an asset management company.
Although we don’t have individual level salary data for each employee, industry stan-
dards suggest that most employees at the company will earn more than R 15 000 per
month, corresponding to the bottom three rows of Table 1.
2.2 Retirement saving at the company
The company allows employees to select a rate between 7.5 and 27.5 percent of gross
salary to contribute towards their retirement fund. For an employee who starts work-
ing at 25 years of age and aims to retire at 65, a retirement savings rate of 15 percent
should allow the employee to draw a retirement income at a similar level to his or her
pre-retirement income.
Most employees at the company save much less than 15 percent per month. Figure
1 shows the distribution of saving rates chosen by employees. Over sixty percent of
the employees contribute the minimum rate of 7.5 percent and only ten percent of
the employees contribute 15 percent or more.
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Figure 1: Histogram of employee retirement contribution rates in the month before
the intervention
2.3 Retirement calculator
Calculating whether your retirement savings rate is sufficient to meet your retirement
goals can be a difficult task. Even if you know all the inputs needed to complete the
calculation, the calculation itself can be difficult. You need to use an annuity formula,
which may not be obvious for many employees.
With these challenges in mind, the company developed a retirement calculator to
help employees check if they are on track with their retirement savings. The calcu-
lator has six inputs: the employee’s gender, age, expected retirement age, balance of
retirement savings, current salary and monthly saving rate. Each input field provides
a hint on where to find the information. For example, the field requesting the current
monthly savings rate mentions that this percentage can be found on the employee’s
payslip. Figure 2 shows the calculator’s input fields and the first results screen.
The result shows the estimated monthly retirement income based on the em-
ployee’s inputs. For example, as shown in Figure 2, a male employee of 30 years of
age with R 70 000 in retirement savings, a 7.5 percent monthly savings contribution
and a salary of R 200 000 would expect to have an income of between R 51 000 and
R 77 000 at retirement, which is equal to between 26 percent and 39 percent of the
employee’s salary.
After the first results screen, the employee is prompted to observe the impact
of increasing his or her monthly contribution rate, adding a lump sum amount or a
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(i) Input fields (ii) Results screen
Figure 2: Retirement calculator
combination of the two. The results screen concludes with a link to a tax calculator
for the employee to calculate his or her net salary after changes in the contribution
rate and a link for the employee to process a change.
The calculator uses several assumptions, which the employee can tweak on a sep-
arate screen. The defaults assume the employee’s salary increases with inflation, the
nominal investment return is between 8 and 10 percent and inflation is 5 percent.
To calculate retirement income, the calculator uses recommended drawdown rates
provided by the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA).
2.4 Email emphasized a target retirement income
The calculator was sent to employees via email with the subject “Are you on track
for 75%?”.9 This percentage, often called the replacement rate, refers to a target
retirement income relative to the employee’s salary. The 75 percent replacement rate
is common rule of thumb for adequate retirement income.10
In the example in Figure 2, the employee reaches a replacement rate of only
39 percent. What contribution rate is needed to reach a replacement rate of 75
9See appendix A to read the body of the email.
10The majority of respondents to survey conducted in the United States and the Netherlands
preferred a replacement of more than 75 percent (Binswanger and Schunk, 2012) so 75 percent
serves as a useful benchmark. The company focused on the replacement rate to give employees an
easy to understand measure of expected retirement income.
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percent? For most employees, the contribution rate should be at least 15 percent,
and sometimes far greater for older employees who have saved very little at earlier
stages of their career.
The required contribution rate can be calculated using a formula derived from
an annuity formula.11 Let p be the goal replacement rate, r be the real investment
return, d the drawdown rate (the percentage of the employee’s retirement saving he
withdraws each year during retirement) and n the number of years until retirement.
For simplicity, assume the employee has not started saving yet.
Required contribution rate =
pr
d((1 + r)n − 1)
If we assume a goal replacement rate of 75 percent, real investment return of 5 percent,
an employee who starts saving at age 25 and plans to retire at 65 must contribute
15.52 percent of his or her salary to retirement. This common scenario explains why
many retirement investment providers and financial advisers suggest a 15 percent
contribution rate as a benchmark.12 If the employee only starts saving at age 30, the
required contribution rate jumps up to 20.75 percent.
To generate a required contribution rate of 7.5 percent, the rate at which most
employees contribute at, we would need to make some significant adjustments to
our assumptions. We could delay retirement from 65 to 79 years of age, increase
the investment return from 5 to 8 percent, increase the drawdown rate from 4 to 8
percent, or some combination of these changes. Since the required contribution rate
is sensitive to the assumptions, the calculator offers the advantage of allowing the
employee to personalize the inputs and assumptions.
3 Experiment
This section describes the design of the experiment. The experiment had two treat-
ment arms. In the first arm, the employee received an email about the retirement
calculator, and in the second, the employee received the email and a phone call.
Each year in late November the company sends letters to the employees which
state the amount of the employee’s performance bonus and the employee’s increase in
11The derivation is available in Appendix C
12For example, articles from Fidelity in the United States, iNews in the United Kingdowm and
BusinessTech in South Africa all suggested 15 percent as a retirement savings rate.
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salary for the coming year. South Africa has persistent inflation of around 6 percent
so salary increases at least match inflation, but can be far larger.
A few days later, the employee receives a form via email to change his or her
monthly retirement contribution rate. This form is sent every year to coincide with
salary increases. Even though the form is not compulsory, employees are far more
likely to change their contribution rate at this time of the year. In Figure 3, I plot
the share of employees who changed their contribution rate relative to the previous
month. The share spikes in December of each year, the first month after the form is
sent.
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Figure 3: Share of employees whose retirement contribution rate differs from the
previous month
Before employees were notified of the amount of their salary increase, the team
provided a randomly selected group of employees with the retirement calculator. The
retirement calculator was sent to the treated employees by email. The email contained
a hyperlink to the calculator.
Since employees receive many emails each day, the email about the calculator may
never be read. A second treatment arm was included to mitigate this concern. In
addition to the email, a team member phoned every employee included in the second
treatment arm to ask for feedback on the calculator. These phone calls ensured the
employee would use the calculator. The team member who conducted the phone calls
worked through the list in the “email and phone” group in random order. For the
employees who did not answer, he phoned a second time.
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The timeline of experiment was conducted as follows:
• 16 November 2018: Email about calculator sent to both treatment groups.
• 19-23 November 2018: Phone calls to the “email and phone” group.
• 23 November 2018: Bonus and salary increase letters sent.
• 26-28 November 2018: Employees receive an online form via email to change
their monthly contribution rate.
The company has over 1200 employees and I selected 775 for the experiment. I
included employees who worked at the head office, were full-time permanent staff
and South African citizens or permanent residents.13 I excluded senior management,
investment analysts and any employees who had knowledge of the experiment.
Since the participants had no knowledge of the experiment, the experiment is
a natural field experiment in the terminology of Harrison and List (2004). Natural
field experiments have the advantage of avoiding self-selection into the experiment
and changes in behavior due to experimental setting. Due to these benefits, a recent
guide on experiments in economics placed a strong emphasis on the value of natural
field experiments (Czibor, Jimenez-Gomez, and List, 2019).
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the sample of 775 employees. Most of
the employees are young. The average age is 33.71 years with nearly 40 percent
of the employees under the age of 30. Average tenure is 5.16 years and a quarter
of the employees have been working at the company for one year or less. Slightly
more women are in the sample than men and 71 percent of the employees were
disadvantaged by the Apartheid government.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 33.71 8.05 21 59
Tenure (years) 5.16 4.77 0 34
Male 0.47 0.5 0 1
Previously disadvantaged 0.71 0.45 0 1
13Temporary staff and foreign nationals are not required to enrol in the company’s retirement
fund.
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The sample of 775 was randomly divided into three groups: the email only treat-
ment group (193 employees), the email and phone call treatment group (194 em-
ployees) and the control group (388 employees). To conduct the randomization, I
stratified the sample into groups according to whether the employee was saving at
the minimum rate, gender, age categories (-27, 28-32, 33-38, 38+ years) and whether
the employee was disadvantaged by the Apartheid government.
Within each strata, half were assigned to the control group, a quarter to the email
only treatment group and a quarter to the email and phone call treatment group. If a
strata contained a number of employees which was not a multiple of four, I randomly
pick one, two or three elements (according to the number of remaining employees)
from the list [Control, Control, Email Only, Email and Phone Call] without replace-
ment.
The stratification provides improved statistical power, especially for the analysis
of heterogeneous treatment effects. For example, to check for differences in treatment
effects by gender, we need a sufficient number of men and women in the treatment
groups and in the control groups. The stratification also helps to ensure balance
between the treatment and control group on key variables.14
4 Empirical Approach
The empirical approach follows a pre-analysis plan registered at aspredicted.org. I
provide the details of the plan and explain any differences between the plan and the
final analysis.
I start by estimating intention to treat effects with the following regression equa-
tion:
Ratei = α0 + α1Treatmenti + δg + i (1)
Ratei measures the monthly contribution rate in December 2018, the first month after
the experiment.15 Treatmenti is a categorical variable for the two treatment arms of
14I check for balance in Appendix B and find no statistically significant differences between the
treatment and control groups.
15I also planned to use the share of the employee’s bonus as an outcome measure, but the company
only provided an indicator for whether the employee had contributed a share of their bonus or not.
Results using this indicator are available upon request.
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received an email only and received an email and a phone call. The control group is
the omitted category. The δg is a fixed effect for the stratification group.
The intention to treat effect measures the impact of receiving an email (or receiving
an email and a phone call) about the retirement calculator but there is no guarantee
that the employee actually used the calculator. Employees receive many emails every
day and this email could easily have been overlooked.
The email contained a link to the calculator and I have data on which employees
clicked on this link. I use two stage least squares to estimate the local average
treatment effect, which measures the average treatment effect among the employees
who complied with the treatment and clicked on the link. The randomized treatment
is used as an instrument for clicking the link.
It is possible that certain groups of employees may be more responsive to the
calculator than others. I stratified the sample with the aim of detecting heterogeneous
effects. I use the following regression specification to detect heterogeneous treatment
effects:
Ratei = β0 + β1Treatmenti + β2Groupi + β3Treatmenti ∗Groupi + ηi (2)
Treatmenti is the same treatment variable defined above and Groupi is an indicator
for group membership.
I registered analysis of groups along three dimensions: gender, age and Apartheid
era racial categories. Since women live longer than men on average, the calculator
recommends a higher savings rate for women. Older employees may respond dif-
ferently to younger employees as retirement is a more immediate concern for older
employees. Finally, employees who were previously disadvantaged by the Apartheid
system may live with greater pressure to support family and have less freedom to save
for retirement.
The registration of groups in the pre-analysis plan prevents the researcher from
forming groups around outliers. However, this approach may lead to important groups
being overlooked, especially if the groups are defined by combinations of observable
characteristics. For example, men over the age of 35 may have much larger treatment
effects than woman over the age of 35. If we study heterogeneous treatment effects
by age and gender separately, we may not detect this difference.
To solve the problem of detecting possibly complex dimensions of heterogene-
14
Treatment 
observation Control 
observation
Age < 35 Age ≥ 35
Male Female
Figure 4: Example of a causal tree
ity while still retaining the transparency of a pre-analysis plan, I included Wager
and Athey’s (2018) causal forest method in the pre-analysis plan. Instead of trying
to specify all possible dimensions of heterogeneity in advance, causal forests use a
machine-learning algorithm to investigate for the presence of heterogeneous effects.
Causal forests average over many causal trees. A causal tree represents a grouping
of the observations. Figure 4 provides an example of a causal tree. We start at the
top of the tree with all the treatment and control observations. In this example, we
start by splitting the observations on age. Employees younger than 35 are split into
a group. If the group is not split further, we reach a terminal group, called a leaf.
For employees older than 35, we split again by gender. This tree has three leaves,
which gives us three groups. The tree is called causal because we can estimate the
conditional average treatment effect within each leaf. For example, in the leaf of
employees younger than 35, we can calculate the average treatment effect using only
the observations which fall within that leaf.
The algorithm forms a causal tree by choosing the groups which maximize the
difference in treatment effects between groups. For each split the algorithm calculates
the estimated treatment effect in each leaf and chooses the split which maximizes
the variance in estimated treatment effects across leaves, but with a penalty for the
within leaf variance in treatment effects. The algorithm stops splitting if the variance
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of treatment effects across leaves cannot be increased or if there are too few treatment
or control observations within the leaf.
Many causal trees are averaged to form the causal forest. To prevent correlation
between trees, the algorithm uses a random subsample of observations and a random
subsample of observable characteristics to form each tree. This process of repeated
subsampling of both the observations and observables is the essence of the random
forests algorithm, a popular machine-learning algorithm on which causal forests is
based.
Causal forests have an “honesty property” to prevent bias from outliers. The al-
gorithm decides how to split a tree with one subsample, but estimates the conditional
average treatment effect with a held out subsample. Since causal forests average over
many trees, all the observations are eventually used in both the splitting subsample
and the held out estimation subsample.
I use the grf R package to estimate the causal forest.16 I build 2 000 trees. For
each tree, the algorithm takes a 25 percent subsample to build the tree and a 25
percent subsample to estimate the conditional treatment effects in each leaf. Leaves
with less than 5 treatment or control observations from the estimation subsample are
not split further. I include age, tenure, gender, an indicator for classified as “white”
during the Apartheid regime and the pre-experiment contribution rate as inputs for
the regression trees.
The final output of the causal forest provides a model of the conditional average
treatment effects. We can predict each individual’s conditional average treatment
effect using the model. An individual is passed down every tree in the forest based on
his or her observable characteristics. For each tree, the individual will reach a leaf,
or terminal group. The individual’s conditional average treatment effect estimate is
the average over the estimates in each leaf he or she reaches.
5 Results
This section provides the main results generated by the empirical approach specified
in the pre-analysis plan and detailed in the previous section. The results suggest zero
to marginally positive impacts of the retirement calculator on contribution rates.
16Visit github.com/grf-labs/grf for details on how to use the grf package.
16
5.1 Intention to treat impacts
I report the results of the intention to treat regressions in Table 3. Notice that there
are 762 observations rather than 775. Ten employees left the company in December
so we cannot observe their post-experiment contribution rate. For historical reasons,
another three employees had pre-experiment contribution rates of less than 7.5 percent
(the minimum imposed by the company). At the time I selected the sample, I was
only shown contribution rates in categories so these three employees were shown as
having a savings rate of 7.5 percent. Since contributing below the minimum is an
irregular situation, I have also excluded these three employees from the analysis.17
Of the thirteen excluded observations, five were in control, six were in the email
treatment group and two were in the email and phone treatment group.
Table 3: Intention to treat effect on the contribution rate
1 2
Email 0.079 0.071
(0.215) (0.073)
Email and phone 0.200 0.059
(0.224) (0.081)
Pre-experiment contribution rate 0.960***
(0.020)
Observations 762 762
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.470 0.925
Control mean 9.01 9.01
Note: The dependent variable is the employee’s re-
tirement contribution rate in the first month after the
experiment, measured in percentage points. Standard
errors, shown in brackets, are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity. P-value < 0.01 ***, <0.05 **, <0.10 *
The first specification, in first column of Table 3, regresses the employee’s saving
rate in December (the first month after the experiment) on the treatment indicator.
Although the point estimates are positive, the standard errors are very large and I
cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact is zero.
17I have repeated the analysis including these three observations with their recorded contribution
rate and with their contribution rate replaced with the minimum of 7.5 percent. Changes to the
regression results are very small and do not impact any of the conclusions or hypothesis tests.
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In the second specification, in second column of Table 3, I improve precision by
including the pre-experiment contribution rate as a control variable.18 Since most
employees do not change their contribution rate during the experiment, the pre-
experiment contribution rate explains most of the variation in the data. We have
more precise estimates of the treatment effects as a result. Confidence intervals of 95
percent indicate the average treatment effect lies between -0.07 and 0.21 percentage
points for the email treatment and between -0.1 and 0.22 percentage points for the
email and phone treatment.
We can visualize the intention to treat impact using an estimation plot (Ho et al.,
2019), shown in Figure 5. The estimation plot shows the distribution of the post
experiment contribution rates as well as the difference in mean between the treatment
groups and the control group. The error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals
estimated by bootstrapping. The plot shows how the bulk of the distribution in the
estimated treatment effect lies very close to zero.
Although we cannot know if the average treatment effect is zero or marginally
positive, the estimates are precise enough to conclude that the calculator did not
cause an economically significant change in behavior. Given that most employees
currently save at the minimum contribution rate, there was scope for large increases
in contribution rates and yet even the upper limit of the confidence intervals on the
estimated treatment effect is very small.
18Including the pre-experiment contribution rate as a control variable was not specified in the
pre-analysis plan. When I designed the experiment, I only had data on categories of contribution
rates and I did not know the exact contribution rate for each employee. The data on pre-experiment
contribution rates was provided after the experiment was completed.
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Figure 5: Estimation plot for the post experiment contribution rate
5.2 Local average treatment effects
Some employees in the treatment groups did not use the calculator because they did
not open the email containing a link to the calculator. Employees typically receive
many emails every day and it is common to overlook an email, especially if the email
does not relate the employee’s current work. If many employees do not use the email,
the average treatment effect will be biased downwards.
To estimate the treatment effect for those employees who did use the calculator
(the local average treatment effect), I use an instrumental variables approach. The
randomized treatment creates exogenous variation in the probability of clicking on a
link to the calculator. In the email group, 27 percent of employees clicked on the link
to the calculator, and in the email and phone group, 65 percent clicked on the link
the calculator. We assume no employees in the control group opened the email since
19
the email was not sent to the control group.
Table 4: Local average treatment effect on the contribution rate
Panel A: First stage regression Panel B: Instrumental variable estimate
Email 0.268*** Click on link 0.307 0.097
(0.032) (0.333) (0.121)
Email and phone 0.651***
(0.033)
Pre-experiment 0.960
contribution rate (0.020)
R-squared 0.43 0.473 0.929
Observations 762 762 762
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control mean 0.0 9.01 9.01
Note: The dependent variable is the employee’s retirement saving rate in
December, the first month after the experiment. Standard errors, shown in
brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity. P-value < 0.01 ***, <0.05 **,
<0.10 *
Table 4 provides the regression results for the local average treatment effects. In
Panel A, I report the first stage regression, which shows the treatments are strongly
correlated with an indicator for clicking on the link to the calculator. In Panel B,
I estimate the impact of using the calculator. In the first column, I estimate an
increase of 0.307 percentage points in the contribution rate. However, the estimate
is not precise and we cannot reject that the impact is zero at conventional levels
of statistical significance. In the second column, I control for the pre-experiment
contribution rate to improve precision. The estimate decreases to 0.097 percentage
points and we stil cannot reject that the impact is zero. The 95 percent confidence
interval is between -0.142 and 0.336 percentage points.
I assumed employees in the control group did not use the calculator. Perhaps this
assumption is false. For example, employees in the treatment group could simply for-
ward the hyperlink to the calculator to their colleagues.19 This possible contamination
of the control group could bias our estimates of the treatment effect downwards.
19Information passed on by peers can impact behavior. In an early field experiment, employees
were more likely to increase their retirement contributions if their peers in the same department
attended an employee benefits fair (Duflo and Saez, 2003). In a more recent experiment, employees
who received information about their peer’s contribution rates decreased their own contribution
rates (Beshears et al., 2015).
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Possible contamination of the control group is not a major concern for three
reasons. First, the share of employees who changed their contribution rate after the
experiment was lower than at the same point in previous years. Just 5.9 percent of
employees changed their contribution rate at the time of the experiment in comparison
to 9.5 percent the year before and 8.1 percent two years before. If contamination of
the control group is masking large treatment impacts we would expect the share of
employees who change their contribution rate to rise, not fall.
Second, the treatment groups did not know they were part of an experiment.
Employees often receive emails sent to all employees in the company and the email
sent with the calculator was very similar. There was no reason for the treatment
group to assume that some of their colleagues did not receive the same email. This
was also the first experiment the company conducted with the employees.
Third, we can recalculate the local average treatment effect for the subsample of
treated employees.20 Within this subsample, we know exactly who clicked on the
link to the calculator and who did not. In the email and phone treatment group,
65 percent of employees clicked on the link to the calculator while only 27 percent
clicked on the link in the email treatment. I run the same specification as in the
second column of Table 4 on the treated subsample and the point estimate is -0.012
percentage points with a 95 percent confidence interval of between -0.391 and 0.368
percentage points. Since we do not find a large effect in this subsample, where we
know exactly who used the calculator, we can dismiss the concerns over contamination
of the control group.
5.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects
I investigate for the presence of heterogeneous impacts by gender, Apartheid era
racial classifications and age. The estimates by gender and Apartheid era racial
classifications are reported in Table 5 and the estimates by age categories are reported
in Table 6. I registered these dimensions of heterogeneity in the pre-analysis plan.
Starting with the first column of Table 5, point estimates suggest that men are
more responsive than women to the email treatment but the standard errors are
large and I cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in impact between men and
women. Similarly, in the second column of Table 5, I cannot reject the hypothesis
20I did not specify this approach in the pre-analysis plan.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous treatment effects (Part 1 of 2)
1 2
Treatment Email -0.191 0.435
(0.331) (0.651)
Email and phone 0.200 0.598
(0.437) (0.748)
Gender Male -0.006
(0.335)
Male x Email 0.718
(0.589)
Male x Email and phone -0.015
(0.619)
Apartheid era Disadvantaged -1.272
categories (0.383)
Disadvantaged x Email -0.420
(0.716)
Disadvantaged x Email and phone -0.584
(0.804)
Observations 762 762
Strata fixed effects No No
R-squared 0.003 0.045
Control mean 9.01 9.01
Note: The dependent variable is the employee’s retirement saving rate
in December, the first month after the experiment. Standard errors,
shown in brackets, are robust to heteroscedasticity. P-value < 0.01
***, <0.05 **, <0.10 *
of no difference in impacts between people who were and were not disadvantaged by
Apartheid era racial classifications.
The age categories of 28 to 32 and 39 or older show impacts of 1.399 (p-value
0.044) and 1.718 percentage points (p-value 0.069) respectively for the email and
phone treatment relative to the base category of less than 28 years of age in the
control group. I test the robustness of these estimates by controlling for the pre-
experiment contribution rate, which is shown in the second column of Table 6. The
estimated treatment effect for the email and phone group is reduced to 0.333 (p-value
0.190), 0.403 (p-value 0.095) and 0.535 (p-value 0.031) for the 28 to 32, 33 to 38 and
39 and older age groups. The estimates suggest employees may be more responsive
to retirement income projections as they grow older and move closer to retirement.
22
I cannot pre-specify all possible dimensions of heterogeneity and certain subgroups
with large treatment effects may go undetected, especially if the subgroups are defined
by complex interactions of the measured characteristics. To tackle this problem, I
use a machine learning algorithm called causal forests developed by Wager and Athey
(2018). The algorithm provides individual level estimates of conditional treatment
effects, akin to estimates provided by a nearest neighbor matching approach.
I plot a histogram of the causal forest estimates of the conditional treatment
effects for the 762 employees in Figure 6. I combine the email and email and phone
treatments into a single binary treatment indicator for having received an email about
the calculator. The conditional treatment effects range between -0.3 and 0.7. Since
the conditional treatment effects are clustered in a tight range around the average
treatment effect, we can conclude that the treatment effect is similar across subgroups.
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Figure 6: Conditional average treatment effects
23
Table 6: Heterogeneous treatment effects (Part 2 of 2)
3 4
Treatment Email -0.144 -0.062
(0.453) (0.207)
Email and phone -0.583 -0.249
(0.361) (0.205)
Age 28-32 -0.403 -0.194
(0.372) (0.188)
33-38 0.280 -0.127
(0.509) (0.185)
39+ 0.225 -0.199
(0.471) (0.183)
28-32 x Email 0.776 0.252
(0.750) (0.240)
33-38 x Email 0.228 0.158
(0.773) (0.239)
39+ x Email 0.237 0.150
(0.800) (0.223)
28-32 x Email and phone 1.399** 0.333
(0.694) (0.254)
33-38 x Email and phone 0.095 0.403*
(0.665) (0.241)
39+ x Email and phone 1.718* 0.535**
(0.942) (0.248)
Pre-experiment contribution rate 0.979***
(0.016)
Observations 762 762
Strata fixed effects No No
R-squared 0.017 0.927
Control mean 9.01 9.01
Note: The dependent variable is the employee’s retirement
saving rate in December, the first month after the exper-
iment. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are robust to
heteroscedasticity. P-value < 0.01 ***, <0.05 **, <0.10 *
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6 Conclusion
The employees in this experiment were ideal for detecting large responses to a re-
tirement calculator showing income projections. Most currently contribute at the
minimum rate of 7.5 percent, which is far below the recommended rate of 15 per-
cent. The timing of the intervention was also ideal for detecting large responses to
the calculator. The company provided the calculator one week before employees were
notified of their annual salary increase and performance bonus. Any changes in con-
tribution rate coincided with the first month of the salary increase so employees could
raise their contribution rates without reducing their nominal salary.
Despite the potential for large responses, the retirement calculator caused a neg-
ligible change in contribution rates. We have some evidence that the impact of the
calculator increases with age, but the impact still remains small within the groups of
older employees. This experiment adds to a growing body of evidence that financial
education initiatives do little to change financial behavior (Fernandes, Lynch, and
Netemeyer, 2014; Miller et al., 2015; Kaiser and Menkhoff, 2017). Why do employees
fail to respond to the information provided by the retirement calculator? I conclude
with some suggestions.
One possibility is the calculator may be a poor means of communicating retirement
income projections. We can dismiss this explanation with some confidence for two
reasons. First, the calculator was developed with thorough testing by a pilot group
of employees. The calculator was improved after the feedback from the pilot group.
Second, after the experiment was completed, the company surveyed employees in the
treatment group and most gave positive feedback about the calculator.
If the information is communicated effectively, another possible explanation is
employees may not change behavior because they are already contributing at their
optimal rate. There are a number of reasons why contribution rates as low as 7.5
percent may be optimal. Employees may focus on repaying a home loan or prefer to
save for retirement through other means. Other behavioral biases besides exponential
growth bias, such as present-based preferences (Laibson, 1998; Goda et al., 2019) and
biased mortality beliefs (Heimer, Myrseth, and Schoenle, 2019), can generate low
contribution rates.
Employees may prefer to save for retirement through other means than the com-
pany retirement fund. Although the company retirement fund offers substantial tax
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benefits and the convenience of contributing directly from salary, employees may have
strong preference for more liquid investments or to focus on repaying a home loan.
Employees could also be contributing at their optimal rate because their optimal
overall retirement savings rate is at or less than 7.5 percent.
If the employees do have present-biased preferences, the utility cost of increasing
their contribution rate the following month may be too high. Even though the in-
tervention coincided with a salary increase, the employees may be resistant to any
immediate reduction in their salary. Perhaps the provision of the retirement calcula-
tor should coincide with offering a Save More Tomorrow plan (Thaler and Benartzi,
2004). Instead of offering an immediate increase in contribution rates, the company
could offer a delayed and automated schedule of increases for the employee to commit
to in advance.
The distribution of contribution rates (with most employees saving at the min-
imum and some contributing at high rates) could be explained by Chetty et al.’s
(2014) model of active and passive savers. A share of employees are active savers who
optimize their retirement saving and respond to tax incentives. These employees do
not respond to a tax calculator because they have already optimized. The remaining
share of employees are passive savers who save at a fixed rate. These employees do
not respond to a tax calculator because they never change their contribution rate.
No matter the explanation for lack of response to the calculator, the experiment
suggests that warning people about the inadequacy of their retirement saving does
little to increase retirement saving. Employers and policymakers may need to look
to other types of interventions, such as changing the default or offering automatic
escalation of contributions.
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A Email treatment
The calculator was sent to the treated employees with the following email.
Are you on track for 75%?
Dear <Employee>
We all want to retire with enough. While there is no easy answer to what ‘enough’
is, a well-researched rule of thumb is that a retirement income equal to 75%
of your final salary will allow you to live comfortably in retirement. This figure
accounts for the adjustments many people make as they grow older, for example,
lower housing and higher medical costs.
Use our retirement income calculator to see how much your monthly salary in-
come in retirement could be and follow the instructions on the webpage to make a
change.
Use the calculator to see if you’re on track.
B Checking balance between treatment and con-
trol groups
Table B1 provides summary statistics to check balance between the treatment groups
and the control groups. Since I stratified by age, gender and Apartheid era classifica-
tion, these characteristics will be balanced by design. The remaining measures which
are likely to be correlated with the outcomes of interest include the pre-experiment
contribution rate and tenure.
Since I stratified by whether the employee was saving at the minimum rate, the
pre-experiment contribution rate could only differ between the treatment groups and
the control groups if most of the employees contributing close to the maximum con-
tribution rate happened to be randomized into one of the groups. This was not the
case and the mean pre-experiment contribution rates are similar across groups. An
F-test fails to reject the hypothesis of equal means across groups (p-value 0.88) and a
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Table B1: Checking balance on observable characteristics
Control Email
Email and
phone
Observations 388 193 194
Pre-experiment contribution rate
Mean 8.944 8.963 9.071
Standard deviation 3.184 3.165 3.626
Tenure (years)
Mean 5.838 5.566 5.638
Standard deviation 4.669 4.881 4.734
t-test with the treatment groups combined also fails to reject the hypothesis of equal
means (p-value 0.64).
For tenure, the means are also very similar across groups, possibly aided by strati-
fying by age categories. Again, an F-test fails to reject the hypothesis of equal means
across groups (p-value 0.62) and a t-test with the treatment groups combined also
fails to reject the hypothesis of equal means (p-value 0.33).
C Contribution rate formula
This appendix show how to calculate the required contribution rate for a goal retire-
ment income. The appendix also illustrates why retirement contribution rates of 15
percent and higher are often recommended.
To calculate the required contribution rate for a goal retirement income, we must
complete an annuity calculation. (The retirement calculator also completed the same
type of calculation.) Let R be the total accumulated retirement savings at retirement,
s the annual salary, c the contribution rate, r the investment return and n the number
of years until retirement. For simplicity, assume the employee has not started saving
yet and the inflation rate is zero.
R = sc
(1 + r)n − 1
r
Let d be the sustainable drawdown rate (the percentage of the employee’s retirement
saving he withdraws each year during retirement) and p the goal replacement rate
32
(the ratio of retirement income to salary).
ps = dR
R =
ps
d
Substituting for R and solving for c,
ps
d
= sc
(1 + r)n − 1
r
c =
pr
d[(1 + r)n − 1]
As the formula highlights, the required contribution rate c is sensitive to the assump-
tions of investment returns r and the number of years of contributing n.
In Table C1, I show the required contribution rates for a range of starting and
retirement ages. I assume a drawdown rate d of 4 percent, a replacement rate p of 75
percent and an investment return r of 5 percent (which corresponds to the upper limit
of the default investment return used by the calculator). The required contribution
rates shown in the table highlight that unless an employee plans to save for more
than 40 years or take a more optimistic view of investment returns, the required
contribution rate is at least 15 percent.
Retirement age
55 60 65 70 75
S
ta
rt
ag
e 25 28.2% 20.8% 15.5% 11.7% 9.0%
30 39.3% 28.2% 20.8% 15.5% 11.7%
35 56.7% 39.3% 28.2% 20.8% 15.5%
40 86.9% 56.7% 39.3% 28.2% 20.8%
Table C1: Required contribution rates to reach a replacement rate of 75 percent
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